Abstract-Software certification has been successfully used with traditional "static" software. With the introduction of new computing paradigms such as service-oriented computing and cloud computing, the existing way to represent software certifications based in verbose human-oriented documents, exhibits many limitations, to the point of making the approach not useful in practice. The ASSERT4SOA project is currently addressing this problem and has developed a computer-oriented representation for software certifications based on a new type of digital certificates called ASSERT. However, in order to be able to represent the huge heterogeneity of certification schemes and standards, the ASSERT specification has to be extremely flexible and rather complex. This in turn, makes the production of ASSERTs difficult, and moreover, limits their interoperability, as to be interoperable, ASSERTS need to follow certain rules. This paper presents the solution adopted in the project in order to improve the interoperability of independently produced ASSERTS. The solution has been evaluated and has received very positive feedback.
I. Introduction
When we look for software that provides some functionality and some security properties, it is difficult to find information about the qualities of the software. It exists poor mechanisms through which owner, developer and a third part can provide information about software. Besides, these mechanisms must be reliable, that means, the contributed information has to be true. The integrity and accuracy of information is very important since the user bases himself on it to make a decision in order to choose a software. Even with these mechanisms and assuming that they are reliable, the user must address the process of comparing software qualities, ensuring that the chosen software provides the required functionality and security properties. This process can be tedious and takes time for the user, depending on the number of software to revise. Therefore, this information, which is provided for each software, must be able to be managed by the machine and this process must be transparent to the user. For this reason, the information provided for the different software as well as being reliable, must be machine-readable and comparable. To sum up, the problem is that the information cannot be managed in a security and automatic way.
Digital Certification can solve the problem of reliability, but actual digital certification is limited and it is not prepared for service-oriented software. However, a machine cannot manage digital certificates due to the lack of certificate processability and interoperability.
This paper presents a mechanism that improves interoperability of digital certificates by means of certificate profiles The proposed solution permits us to give software qualities information, this information will be understandable to machines, and it can also be compared with information from other similar software. An automatic and transparent process to discern whether the software meets the requirements of the user can perform the comparison. This solution is within the framework of the European project ASSERT4SOA
1 [1] . The project affords a digital certificate (ASSERT), which is heterogeneous enough to represent both, the security properties as well as the functional provided by the certificated software. Additionally, as we will see this certification is machine-readable. In a certification process, the Certification Authority (CA) is in charge to assess the software, provides property information and signs this information. Thereby, CA gives us the necessary confidence in the information provided about the software. However, the key element is the ASSERT Profile (AP) which arises from the need to compare ASSERT. Due to the flexibility and heterogeneity of an ASSERT, it exists a multiple possibility for expressing the same information. Thus, AP affords semantic framework, in which it establishes how to express the information in a comparable way without semantic less.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 gives an overview of related work. Section 3 provides the necessary background to understand the proposed solution. Section 4 formally presents the solution, its implementation and gives a use case. We conclude with section 5.
II. Related Work
In this seccion, it presents the different technologies related to this work.
The evaluation of a product, based on a Security Target (ST) declaring conformance to certified PPs, can take advantage of the fact that these PPs have been already evaluated. As a matter of fact, during the evaluation of the ST (a step of the evaluation/certification process), the evaluator checks for the stated compliance and then completes the evaluation of the ST: the PP fixes portions of the ST, which need does not to be re-evaluated.
The U.S. Department of Defence's National Computer Security Centre (NCSC) has then sponsored the introduction of what is known as the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) or Orange Book, that is, the first attempt to create a standard for security certification of software. Orange Book was devised as a way of standardizing security requirements coming from both the government and the industry [2] ; although it was originally written with military systems and applications in mind, its security classifications have been broadly used within the entire computer industry. According to its proposers, Orange Book was created with the following basic objectives in mind [3]:
• Provide sound security guidelines for manufacturers to be able to build products that satisfy the security requirements for sensitive applications.
• Define a systematic way to (qualitatively) measure the level of trust provided by computer systems for the secure management of classified and other sensitive information.
• Allow software purchasers to specify their own security requirements, rather than take or leave fixed sets of security features defined by suppliers.
The Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC) was proposed as a revised, "demilitarized" version of the US Orange Book. The CTCPEC goal was to define a wider set of types to accommodate diverse security requirements. The original TCSEC security requirement types were extended to deal with software integrity, assurance, accountability, confidentiality, and availability as well as the original types defined by Orange Book [4] . In other words, CTCPEC addressed the commercial market demands by supporting a richer classification of security requirements and more expressive mapping of these requirements to security features. Understandably, and regardless of the efforts to ensure backward compatibility, the wider scope of CTCPEC caused a growing incompatibility with Orange Book [4] . This incompatibility, in turn, became a major driver toward a unified, international security certification standard such as Common Criteria.
The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (Common Criteria or CC) is an international standard (ISO/IEC 15408) for computer security certification and the 3. 1 [5] is the currently version. Here, computer system users can specify their security functional and assurance requirements, vendors can then implement and/or make claims about the security attributes of their products, and testing laboratories can evaluate the products to determine if they actually meet the claims. In other words, Common Criteria provides assurance that the process of specification, implementation and evaluation of a computer security product has been conducted in a rigorous and standard manner.
A Protection Profile (PP) [6] is defined as "a formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation independent set of security requirements for a category of IT products that meet specific consumer needs". The CC also defines the concept of PP evaluation/certification, in which the target of evaluation is the PP itself. This certification is done by a CC Body, which involves a CC Evaluation Lab for the evaluation activities. Note that the recognition of a CC certificate is nationally ruled and this also applies to certified PPs.
ICSA [7] security certification is a lightweight certification process whose goal is to alleviate certification costs, certifying software products across multiple versions and configurations. Unlike Common Criteria, the ICSA scheme is not aimed at relating protection requirements to the presence of specific security-related features; rather, it is used to provide a simple yet rigorous security assurance procedure for network and Internet-related software products.
The ICSA certification supports a simple yet rigorous assurance process for security-related software products. ICSA applies the same set of certification plans to each product type, based on a set of certification criteria yielding a pass-fail result. These certification criteria are based on testing the immunity degree of the systems under evaluation against a set of threats and risks, rather than on the system's design, architecture, or any attempt to evaluate the underlying technology.
These certification represent a reliable way to provide information about the funcionality and security of a software. However, this information is not machine-readable. Therefore, this certification is for human and can not be managed by machines.
There are other way to provide information about qualities of software, such Service Level Agreement (SLA) [8] , which is a contract between two parties about the quality of the service. This contract can be legally binding formal or not. The SLA is a tool to establish a relation between a client and a service provider and help both part to agree in some parameters. These parameters determine the quality of the service. They can be response time, time disposability, availability documentation, service staff assigned, etc. An SLA should identify and define the customer's needs, provide a framework for understanding, simplify complex issues, reduce areas of conflict, encourage dialog in the event of disputes and eliminate unrealistic expectations.
The SLA embraces a wide range of issues. Amongst them there are the following:
• Service to be delivered.
• Performance, Tracking and Reporting
• Problem Management
• Legal Compliance and Resolution of Disputes
• Customer Duties and Responsibilities
• Security
Since an SLA is a contract between a client and the provider, the user has to trust in the software information given by the provider. However, this assurance is insuficient, so that an agreement can remain a piece of paper which is not adhered to nor referred to if the commitment does not exist within the organisation to implementing them. Additionally, if there are ongoing problems, this can not have been defined and can be treated punitively. Then, the process can become overly bureaucratic and potenially time consuming to manage.
In a computer network area, the Quality of Service (QoS) [9] refers to several related aspects of service that allow quantify the level of quality. These aspects are usually a list of parameters. If these parameters are within a certain range, they will ensure that service quality is acceptable.
Thus in the case of SLA and QoS, information provided must be certified to be trusted.
III. Background
In this section, we present the project ASSERT4SOA and the digital certificate ASSERT. ASSERT4SOA provides us a service oriented framework for our solution. ASSERT gives us a machine-readable way to provide software information in this framework.
A. ASSERT4SOA
A certificate is a document that ensures the truth of an artifact. In the area of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) there are different artifacts that can be certified. They can be certified from professional skills in certain software or hardware to software systems, with certain invididuales nonfunctional properties, such as security, privacy and reliability. Current trends in the IT industry suggest that future software systems will be very different from their counterparts today, due to greater adoption of Service-Oriented Architectures (SOAs) and the wider spread of the deployment of Software-as-a-Service (SaaS). These trends point to large-scale, heterogeneous ICT infrastructures hosting applications that are dynamically built from loosely coupled, well-separated services, where key non-functional properties like security, privacy, and reliability will be of increased and critical importance. In such scenarios, certifying software properties will be crucial. Current certification schemes, such as Common Criteria, however, are either insufficient for addressing the needs of such scenarios or not applicable at all and thus, they cannot be used to support and automate run-time security assessment. As a result, today's certification schemes simply do not provide, from an end-user perspective, a reliable way to assess the trustworthiness of a composite applications in the context where (and at the time when) it will be actually executed. ASSERT4SOA is filling this gap by producing novel techniques and tools -fully integrated within the SOA lifecycle -for expressing, assessing and certifying security properties for complex service-oriented applications, composed of distributed software services that may dynamically be selected, assembled and replaced, and running within complex and continuously evolving software ecosystems.
The purpose of ASSERT4SOA is to provide a framework for handling Advanced Security Service cERTificates (ASSERT). At the moment, certificates are used mainly for authentication and signature (Public Key Certificates such as X.509 Certificates) or for authorization purpose (Attribute Certificates such as SPKI). In this respect ASSERT4SOA does not substitute any existing usage of certificates but it is provided a new category of services by the mean of digital certificates. ASSERT4SOA reuses the existing infrastructures and technology (e.g. X.509 certificates, SAML, digital signature) to authenticate entities when necessary and to prevent tampering. The originality of these certificates resides in the embedded abstractions (security properties, targets, tests, models), a composition model and complex validation algorithms [10] . Therefore when an ASSERT is bound to a service, the service consumer will benefit from an insight on the security capabilities of the service going well behind the information conveyed by existing digital certificates.
B. ASSERT
ASSERTs have been designed by ASSERT4SOA project to represent software certifications in a way suitable for automated processing. For this reason, ASSERTs are digital documents that represent the information normally contained in current software certifications. Therefore, ASSERTs are a new type of digital certificates, which are implemented as a digitally signed XML document.
ASSERTs are issued by trusted authorities. The specification of security properties and of other information relevant for assessing a service's trustworthyness, are contained in ASSERTs. They are bound to the service to ensure their own trustworthiness. Therefore, they enable service consumers to assure application level security properties during service orchestration and to achieve composite application certification.
A language has been designed for ASSERTs [11] , it captures the semantics of certification activities and results for services and service-oriented applications, in a machinereadable format. The language defines an ASSERT as a digitally signed XML document. This language is rich, precise and flexible,so that, it allows to represent the heterogeneous and diverse information of software certifications. The language is modular, so that each ASSERT certificate can contain the necessary modules to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the representation. The modular structure is the following:
• ASSERT Core language: Contain the common aspects of the certificate (such as signature, validity, ASSERT Authority, ASSERT Issuer, etc.).
• Properties Module: Represents the security properties that are certified.
• User defined extensions: Represents all aspects relevant to the user or domain specific needs (e.g. Accessibility, price, response time).
• Type Specific Modules: The language considers different modules that are used to represent ASSERT of different types (Model-based; Evidence-based; and Ontology-based). The three modules contain specific versions of the following sub-modules: Process Module, contains aspects that characterize a certification process and the definition of a representation of these aspects suitable for automated processing, but also for human inspection. Results Module, expression of the aspects that characterize the possible ASSERT certification results. Serv./App. Module, represents of the target service or application, including certification-relevant aspects Additionally, a tool has been developed to create ASSERTs. The ASSERT Managment Tool (AMT) has been designed to help the user create ASSERT in a friendly and intuitive way.
IV. Proposed solution: ASSERT Profiles
This section explain the proposed solution. Firstly, it shows the motivation of it. Secondly, it exposes the structure of the key element. Then, model of use is provided. In the subsection IV.D, a case of use is given in order to undestand better the advantages of this solution. Finally, a implementation of an ASSERT Profile is presented.
A. Motivation
The Common Criteria (CC) certification is focused on software artefact as a product. It can be evaluated by competent and independent licensed laboratories so as to determine the fulfilment of particular security properties, to a certain extent or assurance. It can study and assess functionality, methodology, design, structure and implementation of the software depending on the EAL (Evaluation Assurance Level, a numerical grade assigned following the completion of a CC security evaluation), which is required for each certification.
ASSERT certificates are service oriented, they certify functionality, that is to say the service offered by the software. This functionality refers to the benefit for using the software artefact. Therefore, it is not relevant how the software is implemented.
The ASSERT Language defines a rich set of fields and structures that enables the representation of processes and results of different software security certification activities.
Due to the nature and heterogeneity of these processes and results, this language provides users with different representation alternatives and structural choices that are necessary to accommodate the aforementioned heterogeneity. For the same reason, the language is very flexible and gives users numerous choices for representing the specific certification process and results, which they have applied to the system that is being certified. However, this flexibility comes with the price of an increased difficulty in determining the semantic soundness of an ASSERT with respect to the certification that is the origin of such ASSERT, and also a higher complexity of the process for comparing two ASSERTs. It is important to note that this flexibility is the result of a conscious decision and at the same time, it is necessary that ASSERTs can represent as many certification processes and results as possible.
At the moment, ASSERT are issued by different CAs, and without any kind of guideline. Every time that a service is certificated, a totally different ASSERT is generated even if the service is so similar to another one. However, these ASSERTs have a limited uses in this way, they produce varieties of names or character chain that express the same. Feature can be expressed in many different forms.
As a result, the ASSERTs cannot be compared. In a real use case, a user needs to compare ASSERTs in order to choice the service that fulfils theirs requirements. An ASSERT is a digital certificate, and it has no sense that cannot be processed.
B. ASSERT Profile Structure
ASSERT Profiles [12] are tools to specify the contents and semantics of a class of ASSERTs. Conceptually, an ASSERT Profile is composed of two parts: (i) A specification of the common structure and the values of specific fields that are mandatory for a given ASSERT Class, that it is called ASSERT Template, and (ii) the specification of the semantics for the ASSERT Class in the form of a series of semantic rules. An ASSERT Template is a partially filled ASSERT that establishes the common content of all ASSERTS created using an ASSERT Profile. Any document derived from an ASSERT template must include the fields and structures included in the template and their contents. The latter part of the ASSERT Template is the Semantic Rules. Such rules define semantic constraints/dependencies for the contents of ASSERTs belonging to an ASSERT Class. Examples of these rules are "expiration date cannot be in the past" or "all files in a directory must have different names". This structure is the most appropriate, since the first part (ASSERT Template) provides a guide for the development of ASSERT, providing uniformity and the second part enables the possibility to express more complicated constraints, such as relationships between different fields. Figure 1 shows the abstract structure of the ASSERT Profiles and the main components. As it was aforementioned an ASSERT profile has two parts: an ASSERT template and a set of rules called ASSERT profile rules. The structure of an ASSERT Profile is fixed by ASSERT Profile XML Schema. Therefore, as shown in figure 2 , an ASSERT profile is an instance of the ASSERT profile XML schema. The cardinality of the ASSERT template element is zero or one, thereby it can contain one or no ASSERT template (an optional element). An ASSERT profile can contain zero or one set of ASSERT profile rules. A set of ASSERT profile rules can contain zero or more rules. Although both elements are optional, at least one of these is required for a valid profile structure.
1) ASSERT Template
An ASSERT template is an incomplete XML instance of the ASSERT XML schema. It is used as baseline for new ASSERTs with specific characteristics defined by this ASSERT profile. Due to the fact that it is not a complete XML schema instance it is not necessary to be a valid one.
An ASSERT template can be considered as a set of implicit rules. These rules are very simple and easy to understand. For this reason it is not required to represent a template as a set of ASSERT profile rules, but used as an ASSERT template -a more intuitive notion for expressing predefined structure and values of profile elements.
An ASSERT template may contain one or more fields contained in the ASSERT XML schema. This means that an ASSERT has to be consistent according to the ASSERT profile to which the ASSERT template belongs, all template fields (elements and values) have to appear in the resulting ASSERT created from the template. Another implicit rule in an ASSERT template refers to a field filled with a certain value (and with certain attribute values). In this case, the resulting ASSERT should have this field with the same value determined by the ASSERT template. The ASSERT template can also express a choice within a field. In this regard the resulting ASSERT must contain the field with a value equal to one of the options proposed in the ASSERT template. Similarly, other implicit rules susceptible of appearing within a template, may be defined (e.g. minimum or maximum cardinality of ASSERT elements).
2) ASSERT Rules
While template implicit rules are enough for very simple restrictions (requiring an element, constraining an element content, etc.), there are cases where more complex restrictions are needed. Some examples of such complex rules can be (but not limited to): dependencies (if the presence or content of an element / attribute depends on the presence or content of another element / attribute), value constraints (a date that must be older than the present, a number that must be between two given values), etc. In order to address the given, and rather common, scenarios a solution was obviously needed.
C. Model of use
To understand the use of the ASSERT Profiles, let us describe the characters and entities involved in their use and how they are related to each other. As it is show in figure 3 there are three elements: an ASSERT, an ASSERT Profile and a Web service. The ASSERT can be or not developed from an ASSERT Profile. The ASSERT profile can have zero to infinite ASSERT intances. The figure 3 shows an scenario that issues an Assert from a Web Service. There are two characters, the service owner, whose service is going to be certificated, and the certification authority who is in charge of assessing the service. The steps are the following: (1) the service owner discloses the functionality offered by the service. (2) The CA assesses the Web Service. (3) The CA makes the Assert with help of the ASSERT Profile, drawing on fields already filled and homogeneity of identifiers. (4) CA issues the ASSERT.
The steps to create an ASSERT based on profile are the followings:
• 1. -A proper profile must be chosen. An ASSERT Profile must suit the service target to certify.
• 2. -A duplicate of the ASSERT Template is created. This new content serves as the starting point for the new ASSERT. This ASSERT has a field with information about the certification of the service.
• These fields are common for the same kind of services.
• 3. -Then, the creator of this new ASSERT, based in the AP, proceeds to edit the content of this imcompleted ASSERT. He usually adds information since in case a field were removed or changed, the ASSERT would not fulfil the ASSERT Profile.
Once the ASSERT has been created, the validation process against the profile can be done as follows.
• A. -It is validated against the ASSERT Schema as it would be if it was a non-profile-based ASSERT. This is the first step of the validation and the most important one; in other case it would not be a valid certification.
• B. -The main structure is validated to see if it contains all the required elements and element contents as declared in the ASSERT Template.
• C. -The main structure is checked for compliance with the profile rules, that is, all complex constraints are satisfied (not violated).
The figure 4 show the three steps of the validation process.
D. Use Case
In the next scenario, we consider a case in which the use of the ASSERT is restricted to represent a specific certification scheme. This scheme is called ASSERT Profiles (APs).
In the scenario, it is shown that a repository exists with a large number of APs for different kinds of services. The repository is divided in domains. We consider that domains are different areas of service functionalities.
Classification of APs:
• Finances domain (AP1, AP2, AP3)
• Data protection domain (AP4, AP5, AP6)
• Tourist Domain (AP7, AP8, AP9)
• ..
For every domain, there are several APs, which gather features, functionality benefits and security properties. The repository is designed in order to cover all the marked needs. Meaning that there are enough APs for different existing services, these ones are able to meet their different types of features.
As described, in every domain exits some kind of ASSERT Profiles. In a domain area, the ASSERT Profiles do not have to be disjointed. An ASSERT Profile is a structure that fixes some fields of an ASSERT. Then, a more complete service can be built from another service; consequently, the AP of the improved service (i.e. AP3) can be generated from the first one (e.g. AP1). Thus, all the ASSERTs fulfil AP3 as well as AP1; therefore, an AP could be contained in other ones.
There is a big company in this scenario. The project officer works in a support role for programmes. In this company, the project officer is in charge of monitoring all the developing tasks. The aforementioned repository is useful for company services development. Before developing a service, the Project Officer decides which ASSERT Profiles must be met for it. In advance, the Project Officer sets the minimum quality services, which will be developed. In this way, the ASSERTs are homogeneous enough for being compared.
Let us describe the scenario: a user wants to use a service to obtain a certain functionality and a particular security property. In this case, the APs are used again, the user selects the AP that meets his requirement, and this AP can be used in order to compare and choose the proper service for the user. The users could add APs to web browsers, and the comparisons between service requirements would be transparent for them. E. Implementation Figure 6 shows a simple example of an ASSERT Profile . The two first fields of the schema contain information about who is the issuer and validation's period of the AP. It is important to mention that this information is no relevant for the resulting ASSERT, it is just about the AP.
The next fields are ASSERT Template and Semantic Rules which are the two parts of the ASSERT Profile. In the example, the ASSERT template fixes the issuer of the ASSERT, in such a way that every ASSERT created from this AP will have this issuer.
Semantic Rules only have a rule in this example, this rule is used to check whether the ASSERT uses a particular ontology in the field Asset (it refers to what we want to protect). The rule limits the values that the Asset field can take, and these values are only those belonging to the chosen ontology and those related to the field title>Default ASSERT Profile</sch:title> <sch:ns prefix="saml" uri="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"/> <sch:ns prefix="assert" uri="urn:assert4soa:assert:2.0"/> <sch:pattern name="ontology integrity check for PropertyAbstractCategory"> <sch:rule context= " assert:ASSERT/ASSERTCore/SecurityProperty"> <sch:assert test= "@Type= http://www.assert4soa.eu/ontology/security/security#Authenticity' or @Type='http://www.assert4soa.eu/ontology/security/security#Confidentiality' or @Type=http://www.assert4soa.eu/ontology/security/security#Integrity' or @Type='http://www.assert4soa.eu/ontology/security/security#Availability"> ASSET must have an Attribute "Type" with a value for the proper Ontology </sch:assert> </sch:rule> </sch:pattern> </sch:schema> </SemanticRules> <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">...</ds:Signature> </ASSERTProfile> 
V. Conclusion & On Going Work
By this solution, we solve three different points of aforementioned problems:
• Software information is not reliable. Certification provides a solution for this issue. A third part confirms the functionality and security property of the certified software. An external Certification Authority (CA), who assesses and reviews the software to certify, provides this confirmation. Therefore, CA offers assurance that it meets certain claims.
• Service information is not machine-readable. ASSERTs are a new kind of digital certifications. They are implemented as a digitally XML document. Furthermore, the language used to implement an ASSERT, captures the semantics of certification activities in a machine-readable format.
• Service information cannot be automatically compared by a machine. As we presented in section IV.D (use case) ASSERT Profiles allow comparing different ASSERTs.
Despite the fact the solution has been presented in the ASSERT4SOA framework, it can be exported to other software domains. This mechanism can be easily adapted to other kinds of digital machine-readable certification.
We are developing this solution in this framework since it provides us the necessary tools and is one of the first more complete in this area. Additionally, the produced work in this project will be validated by different stakeholder, such as Certification Authorities and end users.
To conclude, compare ASSERT improves the interoperability, allowing possible the composition of ASSERT.
Actually, we are working to extend profiles to enable close integration of ASSERT Profiles with existing ontologies in order to further enhance the process of creation ASSERTs. The profile extension will define for which certificate elements what ontology vocabularies are to be used. We plan to use SPARQL language to enable dynamic ontology vocabulary retrieval when one is creating as ASSERT based on a profile. We also plan to enable static definition of ontology vocabularies in cases where an online ontology is not available.
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